In the discussion below, we will examine a specific instance of this transformation.
We will try to reconstruct how changes in intellectual orientation during the Ming-Ch'ing transition period, i.e., the seventeenth century, lead to alteration of earlier exegesis of the Confucian Classics. In particular, we will focus on the famous 8), the Documents became a centerpiece of the Confucian examination system from the T'ang dynasty .
Frequently the Changes and the Documents were paired and given special attention. Many contended that the Changes reflected the "essence of the Tao" ( Tao chih t'i while the Documents contained "its practical efficacy" (Tao chih yung in the world.2
Sung Exegesis : The I-Ii Approach
Among the many teachings and doctrines in the Documents, the distinction between the human and moral mind enunciated for the first time in the "Counsels of Yi the Great" attracted major attention beginning in the Sung dynasty .
In this chapter, the sage-king Shun # (r. 2255-2206 B.C.) admonished the soon to be crowned Yu (r. 2205-2198 B.C.) as follows :3
The human mind is precarious. The moral mind is subtle. Have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose. Hold fast the mean.
The long-accepted K'ung An-kuo jLEk% (156-74? B.C.) commentary to this passage stated very matter-of-factly:
[The human mind] is precarious and thus hard to pacify. [The moral mind] is subtle and therefore hard to illuminate. Hence, one must have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose in order to hold steadfastly to the mean. in his definitive T'ang dynasty commentary to the Five Classics, which was written and accepted under imperial auspices, added nothing to the An-kuo commentary and let the interpretation of the sixteen characters that made up the passage stand according to earlier exegesis.4 In the Sung, however, the passage received new interpretations. So much so that Wm. Theodore de Bary, citing Chu Hsi, has recently described the distinction between the human and moral mind as the essence of the orthodox tradition.
Chu Hsi *% ( l 130-1200), building on interpretations developed by Ch'eng I (1033-1107), gave the sixteen characters a new theoretical twist by subsuming Shun's intent into Chu Hsi's own philosophy of li-hsueh [studies of principle] : 5
Those who speak of the precariousness of the human mind mean that it is the sprout of human desires. The subtlety of the moral mind is the place of honor for heavenly principle. The mind is of course unified. It is only a matter of its being correct or not, which differentiates its name. "Have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose," and you will reside in what is correct and be able to judge your errors. It's a matter of ridding yourself of the difference [between the human and moral mind] and returning to what unifies them. If you can achieve this, then you can steadfastly hold to the mean and not commit extreme errors. It is not that you take the Tao to have one mind and a person to have another; nor [do you require] still another mind to achieve absolute refinement and singleness of purpose.
Chu Hsi was suggesting that his bifurcation between li S [principle, reason, inherent pattern, etc.] and ch'i § § [variously rendered as "material force," "ether," "stuff"; in order to encompass all these meanings we shall use the Chinese term] had its counterpart in Shun's declaration of the distinction between the moral and human mind. Chu was quick to point out that just as li and ch'i were inherently unified in all things, so the mind was a unity, i.e., the container of li. One of its aspects could be described as moral, i.e., the source of li, and the other as human, i.e., the source of desires-hence the source of evil. Su Shih had earlier taken up the jen-hsin Taohsin passage in his commentary on the Documents. There he had argued that this passage described the distinction between feelings (ch'ing '00:) and the "fundamental mind" (pen-hsin He linked the passage to the doctrines of equilibrium and harmony in the Doctrine of the Mean. Yet, Su Shih concluded that this apparent dualism ultimately collapsed: "The moral mind is the human mind; the human mind is the moral mind."6 It was left to Ch'eng I to draw the explicit bifurcation between the human mind as uncontrolled desire (yu and the moral mind as heavenly principle (t'ien-li Master Ch'eng said: "The human mind equals human desires; therefore it is very precarious. The moral mind equals heavenly principle; therefore it is extremely subtle. Only through refinement can the [moral mind] be observed. Only through singleness of purpose can it be preserved. In this manner only can one hold to the mean. These words say it all."
Chu Hsi developed his own views by drawing on Ch'eng I's more clearly articulated dualism, although Chu tempered Ch'eng's position-perhaps with Su Shih in mind.7 Chu Hsi was faulted by many for seeming to indicate that moral principles were metaphysically prior to, and thus in some sense separate from, the material world of ch'i. In the 1189 preface to his Chung-yung chang-chü [Parsing of Phrases and Sentences in the Doctrine of the Mean], Chu made more explicit his reason for linking Shun's distinction between the moral mind and human mind to his philosophy of li-hsueh :8 8
In the Classics, [the orthodox transmission of the Way] can be seen in [the statement] "hold fast the mean," which Yao ? (r. 2356-2256 B.C.) used to instruct Shun.9 [The statements] "the human mind is precarious, and the moral mind is subtle; have absolute refinement and singleness of purpose; hold fast the mean" are what Shun used to instruct Yt. Yao's single statement was already to the point and complete. But Shun reiterated [Yao's] point in three statements so that he could clarify Yao's single phrase. This is the way it had to be before [Yu] could be capable and virtuous. '
It has been no doubt said that with regard to the unclouded essence of the mind and its perceptions [of the world], there is only a unity between them. However, the reason for making the distinction between the human and moral mind is that some [perceptions] arise from personal concerns, which derive from material forms; others have their origin in the correct ways of nature (hsing and pre-' determined forces (ming #) . The way perceptions are formed are thus different. This is why some are precarious, dangerous, and unsettled, while others are subtle, ingenious, and hard to see. All persons, however, have their material [form] . Even if they are endowed with superior intelligence, they therefore all have a human mind. Moreover, everyone has a [correct] nature. Even if they are endowed with the basest stupidity, they all have a moral mind. The two are dispersed evenly in the space of the mind. If one does not know how to control the mind, then it is precarious. The more precarious [the human mind becomes] the more subtle the subtle [moral mind] becomes. The universality of heavenly principle thus has no way to overcome the personal concerns of one's human desires. With refinement, one observes the distinction between the two [aspects of the mind], and they are no longer mixed together. With singleness of purpose, one preserves the correct [ways] of the fundamental mind, and [the two aspects of the mind] are no longer separated. If one obeys this [teaching] , then there will not be the slightest break [between the human and moral mind].
One must cause the moral mind always to be the master of the person and the human mind always to obey it. As a result, the precarious [human mind] will be pacified; the subtle [moral mind] will appear clearly, and all impulses, talk, and behavior will of themselves not reach extreme error.
Yao, Shun, and Yu were great sages in the world. Rulers of later ages, when they wanted the world order of the two emperors and three kings, had to seek the latter's Tao. If they wanted [to seek] the Tao of the two emperors and three kings, they had to seek the latter's mind. To find the essentials of the mind, one must not overlook this book.... The mind of the sages is revealed in the Documents.
Referring specifically to the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage in the "Counsels of Yu the Great,"
Ts'ai made his point even more explicit. Mental discipline (hsin-fa) was the essence of Shun's admonishment to Yii :11
The mind is a person's knowledge and perception. It is controlled from within [the body] and responds to the outside. Pointing to its inception in material forms (hsing-ch'i it is called the "human mind." Pointing to its inception in moral principle (i-li it is called the "moral mind." The human mind easily becomes selfish and is hard to keep universally-minded. Therefore, it is precarious. The moral mind is hard to illuminate but easy to cloud over. Therefore, it is subtle....
If the moral mind is always made the master and the human mind obeys it, then the precarious [human mind] is pacified and the subtle [moral mind] manifests itself.... Probably, when the ancient sages were about to hand the empire over to a successor, they always brought together and transmitted their methods of world-ordering to [him] . This is why [the passage] appears in the Classic as it does. How can later rulers of the people not but reflect deeply and earnestly keep to [these words] ?
Both Chu Hsi and Ts'ai Shen connected the discovery of the Tao and its appearance in the mind of the sage-kings to the theory of the orthodox transmission of the way ( Tao-t'ung There were misgivings about this line of interpretation, however.
Huang Chen generally agreed with Ts'ai Shen's exegesis of the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage, but he feared the consequences of an overemphasis on doctrines centering on studies of the mind (hsin-hsueh L,9,9) by court scholars such as Chen Te-hsiu (l 178-1238).
Huang wrote :13 In modern times, those who revel in discoursing on hsin-hsueh disregard the fundamental message of the whole passage [of sixteen characters] and speak only of the human and moral mind. In the extreme, they only take up the two graphs of Tao-hsin and straightaway say "the mind equals the Tao." Probably they have unwittingly fallen into Ch'an [Buddhist] Wang argued that the chapter was itself a composite that lacked continuity in style and content. He contended that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage had been added to Yao's admonishment to Shun recorded by Confucius in the Analects.34
According to the Analects, Yao had simply said : "Hold fast the mean" (yun chih ch'i chung
The bifurcation between the human and moral mind thus did not represent the authentic words of the sage-kings but had simply been added by the forger to fill out Confucius' quotation.
What was at stake here was that Wang
Ch'ung-yun was claiming that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage did not really reflect the authentic transmission of the sages' methods for mental discipline (ku-sheng chih ch'uan hsin-fa He was directly challenging the classical sanction Chu Hsi and his followers had invoked to justify their philosophic positions.35 The gauntlet that Wang Ch'ung-yun had thrown down was not picked up again until the sixteenth century. Until then, Yuan and Ming Tao-hsueh scholars, for the most part, overlooked the philological implications that had been drawn by Wu Yü, Chu Hsi, Wu
Ch'eng, and Wang Ch'ung-yun. Instead, they debated the "meanings and principles" in the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage.
Ming Exegesis : Reaffirmation of I-Ii
In the fourteenth century, Chu Yu (1314-76) stressed the link between illuminating the Tao in the Classics and thereby effecting order in the world. Chu noted in his commentary on the Documents that the essentials for world order were in the Classics :36
The workings of the Tao should be grasped by first understanding the Classics. Wang said :38 Chu Hsi's teaching on the investigation of things is forced, arbitrary, and farfetched, and is not what the investigation of things originally meant. Refinement is the work of achieving restraint. Since you already understand the principle of the unity of knowledge and action, this can be explained in one word: exert one's mind to the utmost, know one's nature, and know heaven. These are acts of those who are born with such knowledge and practice it peacefully.
When Hsu Ai quoted Chu Hsi to the effect that "the moral mind is the master of the person, and the human mind always obeys it" (see above), and pointed out how this interpretation contradicted Wang's teaching of refinement and singleness of purpose, Wang responded powerfully:39 There is, however, only one mind. Before it is mixed in persons, it is called the moral mind. After it is unnaturally mixed in persons, it is called the human mind. When the human mind is rectified, it is called the moral mind; when the moral mind loses its correctness, it is called the human mind. There are not two minds to start with. When Master Ch'eng [I] said that "the human mind is due to selfish desires, while the moral mind is due to heavenly principle," he made it sound as if he was dividing the mind into two, but his intent was actually correct. Now to say that the moral mind is the master and the human mind obeys it is to say there are [indeed] two minds. If heavenly principle and human desires cannot stand together, then how can heavenly principle act as the master and at the same time human desires obey it?
By dismissing what he considered Chu Hsi's dualist misinterpretation of the moral and human mind, Wang was applying the text of the Documents to his own purposes. He imitated Chu Hsi and appealed to a classical sanction for his own philosophic views. In a , letter in reply to Ku Lin (1476-1545), Wang appealed to the "Counsels of Yii the Great" as corroboration of his philosophy :40
The reason Shun took delight in questioning and examining was to put the mean into practice and extend absolute refinement and singleness of purpose to the moral mind. By the moral mind is meant "the innate knowledge of the good" (liang-chih AM). When has the learning of the superior man departed from practical affairs and discarded discussions? However, whenever he is engaged in practical affairs or theoretical discussion, he insists on the task of knowledge and action combined (chih-hsing ho-i 9;PrJit-). The aim is precisely to extend the innate knowledge of the good in his fundamental mind (pen-hsin). He is unlike those who devote themselves to merely talking and learning as though that were knowledge, and divide knowledge and action into two [separate] things-as if they really could be placed in order and take place one after the other. The moral mind is quiescent and does not move. It's substance, which is most refined, cannot be seen. Therefore it is subtle. The human mind when it is stimulated moves unobstructed. Its function, which is changing, cannot be fathomed. Therefore it is precarious.
The moral mind is nature. The human mind is feelings (ch'ing). The mind is one, but one speaks of it as two because of the distinction between activity and tranquility and the difference between substance and function. Whenever the tranquil controls the active, it is always auspicious. When in activity there is confusion about returning [to tranquility], it is inauspicious. It is only through absolute refinement that one probes incipient forces (chi §#) ; it is only through singleness of purpose that one preserves his sincerity. "Hold fast the mean" is the same as "following the mind's desires without transgressing the bounds of propriety."43 This is what the sages and men of spirit were able to act on.
Harking back to Su Shih's distinction between feelings and the mind (see above), Lo refused to read Ch'eng I's bifurcation between human desires and heavenly principle into the passage. Instead, he pointedly controverted Ch'eng I's position by appealing to the efficacy of desires as means to an ethical life, not an obstruction to it. Here Confucius was invoked as the paradigmatic sage who had learned to direct his desires toward moral ideals and not just deny them.
We find Lo in remarkable agreement with one of the major themes stressed by members of the sixteenth-century "left-wing" T'ai-chou school. Members of this school affirmed the legitimacy of human desires and their fulfillment. Hence the Classic of the Way says: "There should be fearfulness (wei lit) in the human mind; there should be subtlety (wei S) in the moral mind. One must have the enlightenment of a gentleman before he can comprehend the signs of such fearfulness and subtlety."
The forger had pasted these twelve characters together with the four for "hold fast the mean" from the Analects to form the passage in the Documents. Mei Tsu contended that the distinction between the moral and human mind was not one made by the sage-kings. In fact, the bifurcation represented Hsun-tzu's analysis of human nature as evil and thus requiring modification to become good. Probably Confucians of that time were already able to take precautions to this degree; yet several officials of the early T'ang were not able to examine the matter thoroughly. They wantonly took the variegated and distorted [Old Text] Documents of the Later Chin dynasty and prepared an authoritative annotation of it. In the process, the specialized studies of the Han-Wei (220-64) period were discarded and cut off.
Chu Hsi probably was uneasy about certain aspects, but he did not get it right and correct. Master Wu [Ch'eng] employing Huang Chen as a foil to attack the doctrines of the mind (hsin-hsueh) and its transmission (hsin-ch'uan), which had been read into the "Counsels of Y3 the Great" since Chu Hsi. In the process, Ku radically redefined the content and meaning of li-hsueh :78 Principles are what flow between heaven and earth, remain uniform and consistent from antiquity to today, and are always the same. They are complete in my mind and produce effects in affairs and phenomena. Mind is that which governs and controls these principles and discriminates between right and wrong. Whether a person is worthy or not, whether an affair succeeds or fails, whether the world is ordered or chaotic all are judged accordingly. This is why the sages focused on the middle ground between precariousness and subtlety, between absolute refinement and singleness of purpose. Hence, they transmitted to each other the Tao of holding to the mean. They saw to it that all affairs would be in accord with principles and that there would be no extreme errors. Ku's reinterpretation was a philosophic reconstruction, with some philological analysis added to confirm his exegesis. Apparently he did not think it sufficient to dismiss the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage on the grounds that it was a forgery. He was still arguing on the basis of "meanings and principles," while at the same time turning li-hsueh into classical studies.
Ku Yen-wu's stress on practical matters, however, was an indication of the decline in emphasis on moral cultivation after 1644. Wang began with an analysis of the mind's role in the world :83 Whatever may be said and thought about changing the world all takes its source from the mind. To follow its branches and put it to use is to order the mind (chih-hsin To follow its root and establish its essence is to see the mind (chien-hsin
When one sees what is not seen, then one orders what is not ordered. Shun's words were: "The human mind is precarious and the moral mind is subtle." This is to express the reason for seeing the mind, but it is not something those who speak [of the mind] can attain. Why? All in the world who speak of the mind speak only of the human mind.
Then Wang explained how the moral mind differed from the human mind :84
Now with regard to feelings (ch'ing), there is a clear distinction between the human and moral mind. Happiness, anger, remorse, pleasure-these are the human mind. Compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong-these are the moral mind. These two reside in the same house together and reciprocally manifest their purpose. Despite this [unity] , one must acknowledge there is a difference between them.
Written to refute the Buddhist doctrine of mind and its influence on the Lu-Wang school of hsin-hsueh, Wang Fu-chih's account affirmed Chu Hsi's claim that, although the mind was essentially unified, it contained divisions between desires and heavenly principle (see above Seeing k'ao-cheng techniques as a tool (kung T-), Yen Jo-chü contended that this research aid enabled him "to employ the speculative to verify the concrete and the concrete to verify the speculative." He decryed the self-serving ends toward which earlier scholars such as K'ung Ying-ta had manipulated the Classics. Yen noted that a scholar had to "set his mind at rest" ( p'ing ch'i hsin and "compose his temperament" (i ch'i ch'i #%h), if classical texts were to be properly understood.
Since the T'ang dynasty, he contended, there had not been any impartial scholars who had employed empirical methods to analyze the Old Text Documents. Had there been such scholars, they would have found :8?
A forger for the most part relies on what his age thinks highly of, and his phraseology and style are also limited to [those current] in his age. Although he may exert great effort to cover his tracks and escape detection, in the end he cannot escape the predetermined constraints [of language and grammar used in his forgery]. These elements can serve as the basis of inductive reasoning [to detect forgeries].
Rigorous, systematic use of data, although still rudimentary outside the fields of calendrical science and related mathematical subjects, was already common among textual scholars in the seventeenth century. Yen Jo-chf, for example, made use of what loosely might be called statistical methods to verify his claims. After demonstrating that the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage in the "Counsels of Yii the Great" had been taken from the Hsun-tzu, Yen went on to prove why the Tao-ching, which Hsun-tzu had cited as his source for the passage, could not be a reference to the Documents.
Noting every instance where Hsun-tzu quoted from the Documents, Yen showed that out of the sixteen total references he located in the Hsun-tzu, twelve gave the Documents itself as the source (Shu In a letter written after receiving a manuscript copy of Yen Jochi's Shu-cheng in 1693, Mao countered with a direct attack on Yen's position vis-A-vis the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage : "Yesterday I received a copy of your work called the Shang-shu shu-cheng. It is a complete perversion of our predecessors. It mistakenly makes the Documents no more than a forged book." On the key issue of the "Counsels of Yü the Great,"
Mao challenged Yen's demonstration that the human and moral mind passage was taken from the Hsun-tzu:
"Moreover, although the Hsun-tzu contains the human and moral Yao, although very close to Mao and his elder brother Mao Wan-ling regarded the Old Text chapters as a forgery. After Yao met with Yen Jo-chf in 1693 (Mao Ch'i-ling introduced them) to discuss the issue, Yen copied down some of Yao's findings for inclusion in his Shu-cheng. Yen discovered that Yao Chi-heng had made use of sources in very much the same way that he himself had, i.e., to demonstrate where the forger of the Old Text chapters had gotten his material. In fact, Yen quoted Yao to the effect that both the text and the K'ung An-kuo commentary were the work of the same hand, and "Yao had laughed at the fact that persons before had known only enough to question the authenticity of the commentary but not the Classic itself." In effect, Yen was citing one of Mao Ch'i-ling's associates to solidify his own stand against Mao's position. 93 Li Kung, on the other hand, wrote a preface for Mao's defense of the Old Text chapters. There, Li described how Mao had answered many of the doubts he had concerning the text of the Documents. Later in 1699, Li Kung stopped on his way home and met and talked with Yen Jo-chf about this debate. In a 1700 letter to Mao Ch'i-ling, Li wrote that he had informed Yen of Mao's research on the Old Text chapters. Li also added that Yen had said that Mao's work was no doubt intended to refute Yen's own work on the subject.94
In an earlier letter to Huang Tsung-hsi, Mao Ch'i-ling discussed certain aspersions cast on the authenticity of the Old Text chapters and diplomatically (unusual for him) wrote:
Chu To sum up, the Tao of the sages is like the house of a teacher. The [study of] ] primary and derived graphs and their etymology is the entrance. If one misses the path, all steps lead away from it. How can one reach the hall and enter the studio?
If a student seeks the Tao too high and regards with scorn the art of parsing a text, it is just as if he were a bird soaring into the heavens from the roof of his teacher's magnificent studio. He gets high all right, but then he doesn't get to see what lies between the door and the inner recesses of the room.
Others seek only to classify names and their referents (ming-wu) and do not consider the sacred Tao. This [failure] is just like living out one's life between the gate and entrance, never recalling that there remain a hall and studio [to enter].
Efforts to reassert the validity of Sung-Learning ideals did not entail wholesale rejection of k'ao-cheng methods, however. Evidential scholarship remained popular, but it was becoming difficult to justify on its own terms. Many of the defenders of the Confucian tradition by the middle of the nineteenth century took a stand somewhere between the extremes of Han and Sung Learning. They contended that reform of institutions would be successful only if it were based on a moral commitment that reintroduced moral cultivation and a concern for statecraft to Confucian discourse. For example, Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-72), the leader of the self-strengthening movement after 1850, patronized Sung Learning in local and national academics.
In particular, he was a partisan of the T'ung-ch'eng school, from which Fang Tung-shu had risen to prominence. In an 1845 afterword to a pro-Sung-Learning account of Ch'ing dynasty scholarship, Tseng had written :120
In the recent Ch'ien-lung (r. 1736-95) and Chia-ch'ing (r. 1796-1820) eras, Confucians have insisted on broad scholarship. The followers of Hui Ting-yti [Tung] and Tai Tung-yuan [Chen] deeply investigated ancient glosses. Relying on the [Former Han] dictum enunciated by King Hsien of Ho-chien [to the effect that] "one must search for the truth in actual facts," they denigrated the worthies of the Sung for empty scholarship.
What they called "facts" (shih lV) , are these not "phenomena" (wu %) ? Isn't [what they consider] "truth" (shih *) "the principles underlying phenomena" (li)? [The doctrine that] "one must search for the truth in actual facts"-isn't this [process] precisely what Chu Hsi called "fathoming principles on the basis of phenomena" (chi-wu ch'iung-li flJlbll §lfl ) ?
A balance had been struck. On the eve of western imperialism, the virtues and deficiencies of the battle between philosophy and philology had been carefully weighed. Moral philosophy and k'aocheng research were now regarded as two sides of the same coin. The moral mind could not be explained away-whatever its philological pedigree. Once again philology defended moral orthodoxy.
Epilogue
The balance sought by many nineteenth-century syncretists did not last for very long. Most were totally unaware that a relatively obscure scholar named Ts'ui Shu %# (1740-1816) had already pulled the rug out from under them. In the process, Ts'ui produced a major reinterpretation of all ancient Chinese history, which was destined to influence twentieth-century skeptics of China's ancient pedigree. Ts'ui's meticulous excavation of ancient strata of beliefs and myths was motivated by a sense of doubt concerning the historicity of events recorded in ancient texts. His commitment to uncovering the beliefs, and not just the words or written graphs, of the past was clearly indicated in the title of his tour de force : K'aohsin lu [Record of the Examination of BeliefsJ.122 Ts'ui Shu noted, for example, that the genealogies of the sagekings varied from period to period in the texts of middle antiquity. Over and over, Ts'ui demonstrated how the details of an event or the character of a sage had been expanded over time without any historical justification.
With each new discovery of a layer of counterfeit history, Ts'ui became convinced that he was restoring the Tao, the sages, and the Classics to their true ancient forms.123 Ts'ui evaluated, for example, the jen-hsin Tao-hsin passage from within the framework of his revision of ancient history. At the outset of his analysis of this passage, he noted that the forger of the Old Text chapters of the Documents had made every effort to emulate the literary style of the authentic chapters but had failed. Nonetheless, because of the success of the forgery, "the affairs of the two emperors [Yao and Shun] 
